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Large-scale foreign direct investment and intensive business activities by multinational
companies have played a crucial role in Hungary’s transition to a market economy. The
massive inﬂow of foreign capital has supported the macro-economy by spurring e#ective
demand, contributing substantially to its long-lasting and stable economic growth, as well as
to drastic changes in the corporate sector through the conversion of ownership structure,
improvements in production system, strengthening market competitiveness, modernization of
management systems, and revitalization of R&D and innovation activities. In spite of all this,
Hungary still has many problems with corporate restructuring. The Hungarian government
and the business sector are now at a turning point in their passive strategy of economic
transformation.
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I. Introduction
In May 2004, Hungary joined the European Union with seven other former socialist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic region,
1 materializing the
countries long-cherished dream of re-integrating with Europe. The ﬁfteen-year reform e#orts
to tackle systemic transformation by the Hungarian government and its citizens ﬁnally paid o#
after their decision to break away from the socialist regime.
The road to the EU accession has not been easy since the ‘European Agreements’, which
proclaimed that the European club would allow membership from CEE countries, were signed
 This research work was ﬁnancially supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research from the Ministry
of Education and Science of Japan (No. 16530149) in FY 2004. I also wish to thank Keiko Suganuma for her
assistance with my research.
1 The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in Central and Eastern Europe, and Lithuania, Estonia
and Latvia in the Baltic region. The Mediterranean countries of Malta and Cyprus also acquired EU membership
on this occasion.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 45 (2004), pp.93-118.  Hitotsubashi Universityin December 1991.
2 However, Hungary, which had already been engaged in drastic reforms
of its socio-economic systems before its application for membership in March 1994, had
relatively smoothly met three criteria —p olitically, economically, and administratively — to
be part of the EU, which was adopted at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993. As a result,
Hungary was placed on the priority list of candidates for “Agenda 2000,” which was drawn up
in July 1997 to further clarify the policy of the EU enlargement, together with Poland, the
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. Right after this, the Hungarian government started
diplomatic negotiations with the EU committee with the aim of coordinating between ‘Acquis
Communautaire’ —t he code of EU laws and regulations —a nd Hungarian legislation, and
settled all di$cult issues in about thirty ﬁelds just before European leaders o$cially conﬁrmed
on December 13, 2002 that the EU would welcome new members including Hungary.
3 In this
regard, Hungary had always been a ‘front runner’ in the process of the EU enlargement
towards the east.
One of the main reasons why Hungary has been able to promote its systemic transforma-
tion is that this small country attracted relatively large amounts of foreign direct investment
(FDI). The Hungarian government has been making great e#orts to increase foreign invest-
ment from the very early stages of its transition to a market economy. In fact, Hungary had
been a leader in the region in terms of the total accumulated FDI inﬂows through to 1997.
Although Poland and the Czech Republic have ranked higher than Hungary since 1998 in that
category, the country received 24.4 billion USD as FDI during the twelve years from 1991 to
2002, accounting for 19.2% of the total in Central Europe and 14.9% of the total in CEE
region.
4 This vast inﬂux of foreign capital strengthened the Hungarian economy by spurring
e#ective demand, contributing signiﬁcantly to the restructuring of domestic ﬁrms through the
conversion of corporate ownership structure, improvements in production system, strengthen-
ing market competitiveness, modernization of management systems, revitalization of R&D
and innovation activities. In other words, FDI has been a powerful ‘driving force’ for Hungary
to create an e#ective market economy, which was one of prerequisites for joining the EU. As
Ka ´ rpa ´ ti (2003) states, the success of the Hungarian economy during this period was largely
dependent upon foreign investment.
This paper examines corporate restructuring in Hungary during the transition period with
a special attention to FDI. The next section presents an overview of the roles of FDI in the
growth and stability of Hungary’s macro-economy. Section III describes the e#ects of foreign
investment and business activities of multinational corporations on reforms of corporate
ownership and governance and on the improvement of e$ciency in the management and
production systems in the Hungarian ﬁrms. Section IV examines the contributions of foreign
companies to R&D and innovation activity. Concluding remarks follow.
2 The “European Agreements” set forth necessary matters regarding special economic relations between the EU
and CEE countries, such as, political dialogue, free mobilization, economic, cultural and ﬁnancial cooperation
between the two, as well as the candidate nations’ obligation to coordinate their domestic laws to meet designated
EU standards (Tanaka, 1999, pp.8-9).
3 The success of these negotiations is owed not only to the Hungarian government’s diplomatic e#orts but also
largely to political decisions of the EU. Transitional measures included a moratorium on the adoption of EU
standards had been agreed upon in a wide variety of negotiated areas. For details on ‘Agenda 2000’ and ‘Acquis
Communataire’ as well as on the process of negotiations between the EU and CEE countries, see Tanaka (1999,
pp. 8-12), Momozumi (2000, pp. 521-535) and Tanaka (2002, pp. 161-168).
4 Calculated based on UNCTAD (2003, p. 252).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 3.II. Roles of Foreign Direct Investment in the Stabilization and Growth
of the Macro-economy
Hungary has enjoyed positive economic growth for ten straight years through 2003 after
coming out of a debilitating economic slump which had continued until 1994 due to the
confusion arising from the abandonment of its planned economy (Table 1 (a)). According to
preliminary data issued by Hungary’s Central Statistical O$ce (KSH), the real GDP growth
rate for 2003 reached 2.9%, with the last ten year average standing at 3.5%. Since leading
Hungarian think tanks foresee that the country will have from 3.3 to 3.7% growth for 2004
(Konjunktu ´r aelemze ´ sek, 2004, 4. o.), it is almost certain that Hungary will continue its
economic growth also after the EU accession. This long-lasting economic boom has steadily
pushed up Hungary’s national income, leading to an increase in its per capita GDP on a
purchasing power parity basis to 53% of the average of 15 EU economies in 2002 (Havlik,
2002, p. 4).
Investment activities have been a key factor in Hungary’s long-term and stable economic
growth. In contrast to its ﬂagging household expenditures, gross domestic investment has
continued to expand at a rapid pace after reaching its lowest point in 1992, and as shown in
Figure 1, has grown 36.9% larger than in 1989, the last year of the socialist period. Hungary’s
booming economy of recent years has been driven by these intensive investment activities with
F><.1 . E KDAJI>DC D; GDP, HDJH:=DA9 EME:C9>IJG: 6C9 DDB:HI>8
ICK:HIB:CI, 1989-2002
Source: Author’s illustration based on KSH, Magar Statistikai E ≈vko ¨ nyv 2002 (2003, 12. o.).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN 3/their multiplying e#ects. In particular, foreign enterprises have contributed signiﬁcantly in the
form of FDI with positive crowd-in e#ects that have led to additional investment by domestic
corporations (Mis ˇ una n dToms ˇ ı ÿ k, 2002).
5
The concentration of FDI in Hungary during the early 1990s is considered the result of
political e#orts to broadly open up its domestic market to foreign investors and intensely
involved them in the privatization of state-owned enterprises. According to some analysts,
such policies may have been taken not because the Hungarian government was prescient about
the future of its national economy, but largely because of Hungary’s political and economic
situation at the time, such as the large amounts of foreign debt, serious current-account and
budget deﬁcits, mounting pressure from international organizations that feared the govern-
ment would default on the o$cial aid loans, and active lobbying activities by multinational
corporations and by their supporting governments in order for the corporations to take part in
the privatization program. Regardless of the above factors, however, it is a fact that the
Hungarian government succeeded in attracting large amounts of foreign capital especially in
5 Mis ˇ un and Toms ˇ ik (2002) veriﬁed FDI’s spill-over e#ects on domestic investment in Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Poland by using panel data and investment models based on the mix of the stock adjustment theory
and the adaptive expectation theory regarding investment for economic growth, which revealed that Hungary from
1990 to 2000 and the Czech Republic from 1993 to 2000 both enjoyed FDI’s crowd-in-e#ects while Poland from
1990 to 2000 had crowd-out-e#ects.
T67A: 1. S:A:8I:9 IC9>8:H D; I=: M68GD E8DCDBN
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(a) Macroeconomic indices
Gross domestic product1  3.5  11.9  3.1  0.6 2.9
Gross industrial production1  3.3  18.3  9.7 4.0 9.6
Gross domestic investment1  9.8  12.3  1.5 2.5 12.3
Consumer price index1 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8
Unemployment rate (ILO method) - - 9.8 11.9 10.7
Trade balance (million USD) 939  1,195  374  3,623  3,853
Total exports (million USD) 9,588 10,187 10,705 8,907 10,701
Total imports (million USD) 8,649 11,382 11,079 12,530 14,554
Current account balance (million EUR) 109 223 235  2,959  3,300
(b) FDI indices2
Annual FDI inﬂow (million EUR)3 244 1,186 1,142 2,039 966
Accumulated FDI stock (million EUR)3 244 1,430 2,572 4,610 5,576
Annual FDI inﬂow per capita (EUR)4 24 114 110 197 93
Accumulated FDI stock per capita (EUR)4 24 138 248 445 539
Direct investment income (million EUR)  19  26  34  48  98
Number of foreign capital-a$liated enterprises5 5,693 9,117 17,182 20,999 23,557
Total equity capital (billion HUF)5 274.2 475.6 713.1 1,113.2 1,398.2
Total foreign capital participation (billion HUF)5 93.2 215.0 401.8 662.9 833.5
Foreign capital participation rate (%)5 34.0 45.2 56.3 59.5 59.6
Notes: 1 Figures are year-on-year percentage changes.
2 Annual FDI inﬂow, accumulated FDI stock, per capita FDI inﬂow, per capita accumulated FDI stock
3 Figures from 1990 to 1994 exclude reinvestment earnings.
4 Calculated by the author based on total number of population of each year.
5 Figures from 1990 to 1994 are on a subscribed capital basis.
Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH, Magyar Statistikai E ≈vko ¨ nyv (various years), KSH (2003a, 11 o.),
Central Statistical O$ce website (http://www.ksh.hu/).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 30the privatization of the state-owned enterprises by continuously o#ering investment incentives
such as large scale corporate tax holidays and the establishment of custom-free zones in line
with the basic principle of opening up the market and letting foreign investors participate in
privatizing state-owned businesses.
6 In fact, 66% of the total amount of FDI for Hungary
between 1990 and 1999 was invested in privatizing state-owned enterprises (Antalo ´c zy-Sass,
2002, 8. o.). The Hungarian government’s generousity in selling o# its largest public corpora-
tions to foreign strategic investors led to the expansion of greenﬁeld investment as well as to
its export-driven economic growth as noted by Miha ´ lyi (2001, pp. 120-128).
7
As Oblath and Richter (2002) and Antalo ´c zy-Sass (2002) strress, foreign companies now
are increasing their additional investment in Hungary by using earnings gained from their
business in the country (i.e. reinvestment earnings).
8 As a result, the gap between the amount
of capital inﬂow from outside and that of investment by foreign companies including those in
6 Regarding the policy measures taken by the Hungarian government to enhance investment incentives, see
Antaloczy-Sass (2003a) and Iwasaki and Sato (2004).
7 The ratio of FDI to the total amount of privatization earnings obtained by the Hungarian government had
rapidly declined as follows: 1996: 32.3%, 1997: 15.1%, 1998: 0.8%, 1990: 0%. (Antalo ´ czy-Sass, 2002, 50. o.)
8 ‘Reinvestment earnings’ are: (i) earnings of Hungarian a$liates/subsidiaries of foreign corporations that are
not allocated to investors as dividends; and (ii) earnings of Hungarian branch o$ces of foreign corporations and
those of foreign non-corporate entities that are not directly remitted to investors.
6C9 FDG:><C D>G:8I ICK:HIB:CI, 1990-2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.7 3.5 2.9
4.6 3.4 11.1 12.5 10.4 18.7 3.6 2.8 6.4
 5.3 5.2 8.5 12.7 5.3 7.4 3.2 7.8 3.1
28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7
10.2 9.9 8.7 7.8 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.8 5.9
 2,599  2,440  2,134  2,701  2,996  3,988  3,184  3,275  4,667
12,867 15,704 19,100 23,005 25,013 28,092 30,498 34,337 43,008
15,466 18,144 21,234 25,706 28,008 32,080 33,682 37,612 47,675
 1,270  1,408  1,812  3,026  3,531  4,380  3,612  4,900  6,488
3,399 2,143 3,165 2,381 2,489 2,645 2,575 3,068 3,439
8,975 11,118 14,283 16,664 19,153 21,798 24,373 27,441 30,880
328 208 307 232 243 259 252 302 339
865 1,077 1,387 1,621 1,868 2,132 2,390 2,697 3,045
 149  190  377  792  787  824  867  1,050  3,304
24,163 25,671 26,083 26,264 26,438 26,634 26,809 25,693 -
1,972.8 2,438.2 3,470.4 5,001.8 6,282.8 7,608.1 7,787.5 8,703.9 -
1,466.2 1,945.1 2,867.3 4,012.6 5,086.0 5,998.0 6,195.2 7,020.7 -
74.3 79.8 82.6 80.2 81.0 78.8 79.6 80.7 -
(EUR) and FDI income are net ﬁgures based on a balance-of-payments basis.
o$cial statistics available at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank website (http://www.mnb.hu/) and the Hungarian
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9 The amount of this kind of reinvested earnings
from 1996 to 2000 accounted for as much as 44.9% of the total amount of FDI during the
same period (Antalo ´c zy-Sass, 2002, 46. o.). This means that investment by foreign companies
in Hungary is now far from diminishing and is still active enough to stimulate the economic
growth by shoring up e#ective demand on the same large scale as that of the mid-1990s,
although capital sources of investment continue to soﬁsticate its main form with expansion of
business activities by foreign companies.
III. Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Restructuring
Large-scale and continous foreign capital inﬂows have completely changed the supply side
of the Hungarian economy, that is, the corporate sector. The number of Hungarian companies
with foreign participation increased 4.5 times from 1990 to 2002, and the amount of
investment by foreign capital reached 720.7 billion HUF, or 80.7% of the total amount of
equity capital of all Hungarian companies during the same period (Table 1 (b)). The role of
these foreign enterprises has rapidly expanded in the employment, production, investment, and
trade activites (Table 2). In addition, as shown in Table 3 indicating the sectoral brakedown
of FDI in 2002, foreign capital has made inroads into every area of the Hungarian economy,
especially in manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate and renting businesses.
The same can be said about the ﬁnancial sector. By the end of 2000, foreign capital increased
to 66.6% of the total subscribed capital in the banking sector and the number of banks with
a foreign participation rate of more than 50% surged to 68.1% of all Hungarian commercial
banks (Va ´ rhegyi, 2001, 583-584. o.). According to Hamar (2004, 42. o.), the share of FDI of
the total subscribed capital in the ﬁnancial service sector also expanded from 44% in 1996 to
89% in 2001.
In Hungary, ‘foreign companies’ (ku ¨l fo ¨l di e ´ rdekeltse ´ g ÿ ÿ uv a ´ llalkoza ´ s) are deﬁned as those
with a foreign participation rate of more than 10%. Almost all foreign companies in the
country, however, far exceed such standard, as seen in the fact that the share of 100%
9 Until 2003, the o$cial FDI statistics on a balance-of-payments basis did not include the data on reinvestment
earnings. Figures in Table 1 (b) are those revised in 2004.
T67A: 2. PDH>I>DC D; FDG:><C CDBE6C>:H >C I=: CDGEDG6I: S:8IDG1
19942 19952 19962 19972 19982 19992 20003 20013
(%)
Employment 24 33 29 32 36 37 35 35
Net sales revenue 38 41 44 48 48 50 47 49
Added value 39 39 43 48 48 49 44 45
Investment 51 60 54 60 60 59 53 50
Exports 54 58 69 75 77 80 73 81
Imports 57 63 70 74 74 76 71 79
Notes: 1 Figures indicate share of foreign-a$liated enterprises with 10 percent or more of foreign ownership in
the overall corporate sector.
2 Calculation on a subscribed capital basis.
3 Calculation on a equity capital basis.
Source: Based on KSH (2003a, 16, 21. o.) and Fazekas (2003, 220. o).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 32foreign-owned enterprises in the total number of Hungarian foreign companies increased from
1.8% in 1989 to 61.8% in 2000 while the share of joint venture companies with a domestic
participation rate of over 50% sharply fell from 86.7% to 17.2% during the same period
(Inzelt, 2003, p. 13). By the end of the 1990s, 76 of the top 100 of the world’s largest
corporations had entered the Hungarian market in some form (Antalo ´c zy-Sass, 2003b, 20. o.).
Currently, establishing a 100%-owned subsidiary is the most common way of doing business
in Hungary for major multinational companies. This trend can be seen also for Japanese
companies operating in Hungary. As of March 2003, 61 or 70.1% of 87 Japanese-capital-
a$liated enterprises in Hungary were wholly owned subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies
or those of Japanese companies’ a$liates in Europe (Table 4). This trend has been gaining
momentum against the background of an increasing number of Japanese companies coming to
the country as suppliers for European a$liates of Japanese electronic and auto manufacturers.
Hungarian a$liates of these Japanese corporations such as Panasonic, SONY and SUZUKI,
as well as those of other multinational enterprises such as Audi, Philips, IBM, Nokia, GE and
Opel, have now become the leading companies in Hungary. This is why Hungary is known as
a country, along with Ireland and Malaysia, whose industry is overwhelmingly dominated by
foreign capital (Hunya, 2002, p. 11).
T67A: 3. FDG:><C D>G:8I ICK:HIB:CI 7N IC9JHIG>6A S:8IDG, 2002
Industry, branch
Enterprises Total equity capital FDI share in
total equity
capital (%) Number Share (%) Billion HUF Share (%)
Agriculture 861 3.4 94.6 1.1 89.6
Mining and quarrying 59 0.2 18.1 0.2 85.6
Manufacturing 3,692 14.4 3,990.7 45.8 79.9
Food, beverages and tobacco products 435 1.7 528.1 6.1 88.9
Textiles 414 1.6 66.1 0.8 91.7
Leathers 107 0.4 18.8 0.2 96.3
Wood and wood products 165 0.6 34.5 0.4 92.8
Pulp, paper, paper products and printing 378 1.5 120.3 1.4 88.5
Fuel and chemical products1 137 0.5 1,064.3 12.2 42.3
Rubber and plastic products 273 1.1 133.1 1.5 92.9
Other non-metallic mineral products 157 0.6 184.0 2.1 94.3
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 519 2.0 128.7 1.5 92.3
Machinery and equipments 328 1.3 227.2 2.6 87.4
Electrical and optical equipments 457 1.8 675.6 7.8 96.9
Transport equipments 108 0.4 786.6 9.0 97.0
Others 214 0.8 23.4 0.3 90.2
Electricity, gas and water supply 52 0.2 460.6 5.3 70.6
Construction 1,004 3.9 84.5 1.0 87.2
Wholesale, retail trade and repair 10,618 41.3 846.6 9.7 94.7
Hotels and restaurants 1,221 4.8 111.8 1.3 68.2
Transport, storage, post and telecommunications 766 3.0 1,086.2 12.5 63.8
Financial intermediation 220 0.9 896.8 10.3 92.3
Real estate and renting and business activities 6,356 24.7 1,043.2 12.0 83.7
Others 844 3.3 70.8 0.8 84.3
Total 25,693 100.0 8,703.9 100.0 80.7
Notes: 1 Includes coke, reﬁned petroleum products, nuclear fuel and man-made ﬁbers.
Source: Based on KSH, Magyar Statistikai E ≈vko ¨ nyv 2002 (2003, 294-295. o.)
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN 33As already mentioned in the previous section, the priority of selling o# state-owned
enterprises to strategic investors, as well as greenﬁeld investment activities by multinational
corporations, has led to the emergence of strong corporate ownership of Hungary’s core
businesses. Direct corporate control by these new types of owners has been e#ective in
alleviating so-called ‘agency problems’ and has prevented Hungary from being troubled by
serious corporate governance woes —e specially, those arising from heavy insider-control
ownership —w hich have confronted other post-communist countries. In this context, it is
remarkable that To ¨r o ¨ k (1998, p. 172) presented the view that in Hungarian companies,
management and supervisory organs including the Board of Directors, do not have a
substantial inﬂuence on corporate strategies except for daily management issues.
Foreign companies thus formed a ‘mega economic sector’ in Hungary (Nishimura, 2000,
p. 336) and brought about signiﬁcant changes in the corporate ownership and governance
structure of Hungarian ﬁrms. The increased number of foreign-owned companies has had a
remarkable inﬂuence on Hungary’s industrial and trading structures, especially in its manufac-
turing sector, and greatly contributed to the improvement of its productivity.
The penetration of foreign capital has resulted in drastic changes to Hungary’s industrial
structure. From 1995 to 2002, the share of the manufacturing sector in the total industrial
production increased by 8.0% to 90.4% (Table 5). During the same period, production in the
machine industries, in which about half of Hungary’s total FDI has been concentrated, jumped
phenomenally to 29.0% of the total industrial production, while the share of traditional
industrial sectors in the socialist era including food, wood and paper, and light industries
combined declined by as much as 10.6%. The market environment also greatly changed during
this time. For example, according to estimates by E ≈ltet ÿ ÿ o (2001, pp. 6-10), the market share of
100% domestically-owned enterprises was completely surpassed by that of foreign-a$liated
companies during the seven years from 1993 to 1999. The share of foreign enterprises in the
manufacturing sector and in the export market increased to 71.8% and to 88.6% respectively
in 1999. Based on a review of ﬁnancial data of Hungarian manufacturing companies from 1996
to 2000, Hamar points out that there was a signiﬁcant positve relation between these
companies’ foreign participation rates and their degrees of export orientation, which is
consistent with the ﬁndings of E ≈ltet ÿ ÿ o (2001).
10
10 The ‘degree of export orientation’ is deﬁned as the share of exports in total net sales.
T67A: 4. TNE:H D; J6E6C:H: ECI:GEG>H:H >C HJC<6GN 7N >C9JHIG>6A
S:8IDG, 6H D; M6G8= 2003
Manufacturing Trade Finance Others1 Total
(No. of enterprises)
Subsidiaries/A$liations 33 33 1 7 74
Wholly owned Japanese corporations 19 11 0 3 33
Joint venture enterprises 5503 1 3
Others2 9 1 711 2 8
Liaison o$c e s 5503 1 3
Total 38 38 1 10 87
Notes: 1 Includes construction, consulting services and software development.
2 Includes corporations in European countries.
Source: Compiled by the author based on JETRO Budapest O$ce (2003).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +**Under these circumstamces, the total trade volume of Hungary surged 10.8 times from
1992 to 2002, while that with EU members rose at a more rapid pace, marking a 15.3 times
increase over the same period.
11 Such dominance of foreign enterprises over the export
activities is closely related to the fact that the a$liates of multinational corporations in
Hungary have continued to actively supply their products to EU markets in line with their
global marketing strategies.
Many previoius studies indicate that foreign ﬁrms greatly contributed to the improvement
of productivity of the Hungarian corporate sector. For example, Hunya (2002, p. 12)
estimates that labor productivity of foreign companies was as much as 3.1 times higher than
that of domestic ﬁrms in 1999, the largest di#erence noticed among ten Central and Eastern
European countries. The statistical o$ce also recognized that a signiﬁcant labor productivity
gap does exist between the two groups (KSH, 2003d). They estimate that the average
added-value per employee of foreign ﬁrms was 1.8 times higher than domestic corporations,
adding that much larger gaps were observed in several industrial categories (Table 6).
Moreover, Hamar (2004, 43-44. o.) estimates that the di#erence between foreign corporations
and domestic ﬁrms in productivity, added-value, wage level and capital equipment ratio per
employee reached 2.9 times, 4.0 times, 1.6 times and 3.2 times respectively in 2000.
There also have been many quantitative analyses on this topic. By estimating Cobb-
Douglas production functions based on cross-section data of 1994-1997, Szekeres (2001) show
11 Calculated based on Magyar Statistikai E ≈vko ¨ nyv 2002 (2003, 331. o.).
T67A: 5. CDBEDH>I>DC D; GGDHH IC9JHIG>6A OJIEJI 7N SJ7H:8IDGH, 1995-20021
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(Total gross output100)
Mining and quarrying 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5
Manufacturing 82.4 82.3 84.2 86.2 87.7 89.8 90.1 90.4
Light industries2 33.8 32.9 29.3 27.4 26.2 24.4 23.9 23.2
Food, beverages and tobacco products 24.1 23.7 20.2 18.4 17.5 15.8 15.1 14.9
Textiles 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.7
Leathers 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Wood and wood products 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Pulp, paper, paper products and printing 4.1 3.8 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 3.9
Raw material industries2 33.6 32.4 31.2 29.2 25.4 24.2 23.7 23.2
Fuel products 7.4 7.2 6.4 6.6 5.2 4.4 4.1 4.0
Chemical products 11.4 10.7 10.5 8.7 7.2 6.8 6.3 6.2
Rubber and plastic products 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.5
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 8.7 8.4 8.3 7.7 7.1 7.3 7.3 6.8
Machine industries2 13.7 16.1 22.4 28.4 35.0 40.1 41.4 42.7
Machinery and equipments 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0 5.1
Electrical and optical equipments 4.0 5.6 9.2 12.2 17.5 23.0 24.0 24.5
Transport equipments 4.9 6.0 9.1 12.2 13.5 13.4 13.4 13.1
Others 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4
Electricity, gas and water supply 16.3 16.4 14.8 13.1 11.6 9.7 9.3 9.1
Notes: 1 All ﬁgures are based on 2002 prices.
2 A category introduced by the author for special reference.
Source: Based on KSH (2003c, 266. o.).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN +*+that total factor productivity (TFP) tended to improve in proportion to the growth of the
foreign participation rate. Using a large-scale database covering about 90% of all Hungarian
manufacturing and construction ﬁrms, Sgard (2001) conﬁrmed that TFP showed a signiﬁcant
increase of 38.5% on average when the foreign ownership rate was expanded from 0% to
100%. Nova ´ k (2002) also found that Hungarian corporations with a foreign ownership rate
of over 50% probably succeeded in the improvement of their productivity at a faster pace than
other enterprises, based on regression analysis on the productivity of foreign-owned corpora-
tions by estimating three quantitative models including a simultaneous equation model
designed to treat the endogeneity of the investment decision-making process of foreign ﬁrms.
The above research suggest that there is a close relation between the fact-ﬁnding of Oblath
and Richter (2002, p. 17) in which the productivity of the Hungarian manufacturing sector
rose at an average annual rate of 15.4% from 1993 to 2000 —am uch faster pace than any
other CEE countries —a nd large inﬂows of foreign capital into Hungary during this period.
However, categorizing Hungarian ﬁrms into only two groups, ‘foreign-a$liated corporations’
and ‘domestically-owned corporations’ is insu$cient. As Halpern and K ÿ ÿ oro ¨s i (2000) and
Nova ´ k (2003) point out, it is impossible to strictly verify the relation between the growth of
foreign investment and the improvement of productivity, considering the selection bias that
foreign investors may choose domestic companies for investment, because those companies
have the signiﬁcant potential to improve their own management e$ciency and productivity in
comparison with their competitors.
12 Furthermore, we have to pay attention to the possibility
12 While Halpern and K ÿ ÿ oro ¨ si (2000) state, based on their estimates of Dynamic Cobb-Douglas frontier produc-
tion functions using dataset from 1990 to 1997, that selection bias e#ects can be observed only during the initial
few years of the transition period, Nova ´ k (2003), who came up with estimated production functions in ﬁxed e#ect
T67A: 6. L67DG PGD9J8I>K>IN 7N IC9JHIG>6A S:8IDG 6C9 7N







100% 50-99% Less than 50%
Overall corporate sector 56.7 90.0 119.9 92.1
Food, Beverage 42.5 126.3 98.8 70.9
Chemical 35.1 106.8 99.6 94.4
Electronics 63.1 99.0 96.8 124.3
Transport equipment 20.5 112.5 86.4 23.5
Power generation 84.3 101.1 99.9 101.2
Agriculture 47.8 115.1 81.5 75.8
Construction 49.8 900.6 50.0 86.9
Wholesale 44.2 104.2 90.3 91.6
Retail 83.3 111.6 60.5 101.8
Land transport 52.9 97.5 161.9 67.9
Post/Telecommunications 11.6 33.9 87.4 243.6
Real estate 18.9 142.6 37.4 144.2
Services 51.9 97.6 111.3 87.8
Notes: The above ﬁgures are those when the average added-value per employee of foreign-a$liated enterprises
is set as 100.
Source: KSH (2003d, 29. o.).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*,that the improvement of proﬁtability and productivity of foreign corporations in their
accounts might be largely due to preferential investment incentives toward foreign investors
adopted by the Hungarian government, which was not granted to domestic enterprises. A way
to mitigate these problems is to compare newly established FDI-based companies and major
domestic corporations. Here, we discuss Hungarian a$liates of multinational corporations. As
already mentioned above, those local subsidiaries —a lmost all of which were established in the
framework of greenﬁeld investment —c an fully utilize management know-how and produc-
tion technologies devised by their parent multinational ﬁrms. Therefore, such wholly owned
companies of multinationals could easily dominate privatized, formerly state-owned enter-
prises and other domestic corporations —b oth of which have been a%icted with a negative
legacy from the socialist era —i n terms of management e$ciency and productivity. Results of
empirical analysis support this presumption.
Table 7, which compares Hungary’s major 167 corporations listed in Figyel ÿ ÿ o magazine in
2002 by using representative management and ﬁnancial indexes, reveals that there is a clear
di#erence in average performance between multinational-a$liated corporations and domestic
corporations.
13 In particular, there is a large gap in statistical signiﬁcance between the two
groups regarding return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). This is noteworthy, as
it demonstrates that a$liate companies of multinationals enjoy remarkable capital e$ciency.
Next we examined the e#ects of the organizational form as a multinational a$liate
company on TFP by regression analysis. Following Szekeres (2001), we estimated log-linear
Cob-Douglas function with a constant dummy (MNCs), which controls the recognition of
being a 100% multinational-a$liate, and checked its value and statistical signiﬁcance. Two
kinds of data —t he ﬁrst set is an unbalanced panel of 237 corporations and the second set is
a balanced panel of 118 corporations, both of which are listed on Figyel ÿ ÿ o magazine’s leading
corporation rankings through to 1999 —w ere used for estimation. We conducted cross-section
models by using 1992 — 1998 panel data on industrial ﬁrms, suggests that selection bias e#ects are universal. In
this way, there are di#erent views on selection bias e#ects over time.
13 Most of the domestic corporations used in the analysis are public enterprises and privatized ex state-owned
ﬁrms. The latter include many foreign companies. Therefore, the problem of superﬁcial accounting improvements
owing to favorable policies for FDI can be mostly eliminated in the analysis.













All 167 enterprises 315.89 3,813.63 4,073.02 84.36 7.53
Subsidiaries of
multinational enterprises 347.48 4,734.69 4,348.71 *179.45 **9.73
Other enterprises 297.23 3,269.76 3,910.24 28.21 6.23
Notes: 1 Return on equity  current proﬁts / equity capital
2 Return on assets  current proﬁts / total assets
3 **: Statistical signiﬁcance of di#erence in mean values from domestic enterprises at the 5% level,
*: at the 10% level.
Source: Author’s estimation based on Figyel ÿ ÿ o (2003, 32-39. o.).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN +*-analyses for each of the 1999-2002 data and panel-data analyses using all observations. In the
latter case, individual e#ects of samples were taken into consideration by estimating ﬁxed and
ramdom e#ects models.
Panel (a) in Table 8 shows results based on the unbalanced panel data, and panel (b)
refers to those based on the balanced panel. These results are almost satisfactory, because signs
of explanatory variables are consistent with theoretical assumptions and the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale is virtually met in all cases.
The e#ects of MNCs on TFPa re positive throughout the analytical period withs tatistical
signiﬁcance.I n addition, the ﬁxed e#ect model andr andome #ects model estimations indicate
that there is a 1%l evel of signiﬁcant di#erence between the above two sampling groups
regarding the mean of individuale #ects. That is to say, multinational corporations had much
larger individuale #ects thano ther corporations. These ﬁndings verify the superiority of
multinational corporations as production organizations compared to otherH ungarian enter-
prises. Therefore, our empirical results — which strongly suggest that the expansion of
multinational corporations contributedt ot he improvement ofe $ciency in the overall corporate
sectori n Hungary —s u p ports assertions by preceding studies by Hunya (2002) ando thers.
In summary, the large-scale FDI inﬂow and massive embarkation of multinational
T67A: 8R :<G:HH>DC AC6ANH>H DC E;;>8>:C8N D; LD86A SJ7H>9>6G>:H
D; MJAI>C6I>DC6A ECI:GEG>H:H
(a) Estimation results based on unbalanced panel of 237 corporations1
Estimation period 1999 2000 2001 2002 1999-2002
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed e#ects2 Random e#ects
Const.
7.691*** 7.949*** 8.320*** 7.735*** 7.751*** 6.793*** 7.532***
(22.68) (24.12) (28.71) (23.72) (46.59) (22.55) (38.75)
ln(K)
0.286*** 0.214*** 0.200*** 0.235*** 0.229*** 0.190*** 0.189***
(5.41) (4.25) (4.71) (5.10) (9.70) (8.41) (9.48)
ln(L)
0.713 0.699* 0.735* 0.714** 0.763*** 0.782*** 0.768***
(1.19) (1.65) (1.65) (2.44) (3.00) (6.72) (6.00)
MNCs
0.398*** 0.336** 0.316*** 0.345*** 0.342*** --
(2.80) (2.50) (2.83) (3.11) (5.57)
00D
---- 0.163* 0.197*** 0.202***
(1.93) (8.93) (9.18)
01D
---- 0.269*** 0.345*** 0.353***
(3.30) (15.43) (16.02)
02D
---- 0.288*** 0.385*** 0.393***
(3.50) (15.87) (16.63)
Mean of individual e#ects
Multinationals ----- 0.230 0.205
Other ﬁrms ----- 0.134 0.096
R2 0.329 0.297 0.279 0.340 0.324 0.970 0.794
Adj. R2 0.315 0.283 0.267 0.329 0.318 0.955 0.792
F 22.920*** 22.092*** 23.842*** 30.962*** 53.664*** 65.314*** 517.322***
N 144 161 189 184 678 678 678
(Continued on the next page)
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*.corporations changed the corporate ownership and governance structure in Hungarian ﬁrms as
well as played a crucial role in improving export competitiveness and streamlining its
management and production activities. The next section will further demonstrates FDI e#ects
by focusing on R&D and innovation activities, both of which are also important aspects of
corporate restructuring.
IV. Foreign Direct Investment and R&D / Innovation Activities
In the late 1980s, Hungary spent 2.5% of its GDP on R&D, which is a large percentage
(b) Estimation results based on balanced panel of 118 corporations
Estimation period 1999 2000 2001 2002 1999-2002
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed e#ects3 Random e#ects
Const.
7.360*** 8.004*** 8.109*** 8.018*** 7.636*** 6.664*** 7.506***
(19.27) (20.18) (20.31) (19.41) (37.59) (19.16) (29.74)
ln(K)
0.318*** 0.234*** 0.212*** 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.255*** 0.257***
(5.26) (3.97) (3.64) (3.70) (8.33) (6.25) (6.98)
ln(L)
0.722* 0.634** 0.749 0.718* 0.705* 0.654*** 0.626***
(1.84) (1.96) (1.47) (1.65) (2.18) (7.89) (6.80)
MNCs
0.427*** 0.393** 0.449*** 0.519*** 0.443*** --
(2.76) (2.45) (2.86) (3.28) (5.67)
00D
---- 0.228** 0.210*** 0.215***
(2.34) (9.06) (9.31)
01D
---- 0.320*** 0.335*** 0.345***
(3.28) (14.06) (14.68)
02D
---- 0.371*** 0.380*** 0.389***
(3.80) (15.59) (16.22)
Mean of individual e#ects
Multinationals ----- 0.451 0.376
Other ﬁrms ----- 0.190 0.159
R2 0.380 0.303 0.314 0.329 0.352 0.973 0.559
Adj. R2 0.363 0.285 0.295 0.311 0.344 0.964 0.554
F 23.237*** 16.509*** 17.354*** 18.637*** 42.086*** 103.195*** 118.125***
N 118 118 118 118 472 472 472
Notes: 1 The estimation equation is formulated as follows: ln(Y)ma1ln(K)a2ln(L)a3MNCs[a400
Da501Da602D]e; Y is total annual sales (million HUF). K is total equity capital (million
HUF). L is annual average number of employees adjusted di#erences in average work hours per
employee based on Fazekas and Koltay (2003, pp. 216-217). MNCs is a dummy of multinational
corporations. 00D, 01D and 02D are year dummies. m and ai are constant terms. e is an error term.
MNCs is excluded when estimating ﬁxed e#ects models and random e#ects models.
2 Hausman test for the speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed and random e#ects models: c218.625, p0.002.
3 Hausman test for the speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed and random e#ects models: c215.871, p0.003.
4 The t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***: signiﬁcance at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcance at the 5%
level, *: signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
5 : Statistical signiﬁcance of the mean di#erences from domestic enterprises at the 1% level.
Source: Estimated by the author based on Figyelo (2001, 30-37. o.; 2002, 30-37. o.; 2003, 32-39. o.).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN +*/by international standards of the time (Bala ´ zs, 1994, p. 283). However, the ensuing full-
ﬂedged transition to a market economy brought about a drastic reduction in Hungary’s R&D
activities. By 1996, the R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP dropped to 0.7% and the
total number of researchers fell by 53.2%. In particular, the number of corporate researchers
diminished sharply by 76.6% during the same period (Table 9). Even during the high
economic growth after 1997, R&D activities stagnated at low levels. In 2002, the R&D
expenditure as a percentage of GDP was almost 1.0%, which is much lower than those
recorded during the socialist era. This scale is much smaller than the average of developed
countries, as well as that of 15 EU nations (Figure 2). Figure 3 indicates that although R&D
activities in Hungary have been on the rise over the past few years, their growth rates have
been very moderate. The R&D expenditure for 2002 was still below the 1990 level.
The full-scale transition to a market economy, the disappearance of the COMECON
market and the drastic reduction in the government’s R&D spending including those for
corporate subsidies were grave ‘external shocks’ which led to the rapid downsizing of the
national R&D sector. At the initial transition stage of economic transformation, the Hungar-
ian government did not initiate consistent policies to stimulate R&D and innovation activities
due to the lack of clear recognition regarding the linkage between economic growth and
technological development —w hich also accelerated the stagnation of its R&D sector (Havas,
2002, pp. 16-17).
Meanwhile, as many researchers point out, Hungary’s R&D system during its socialist era
T67A: 9. S:A:8I:9 IC9>8:H D; R&D A8I>K>I>:H >C
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total sta# number 36,384 29,397 24,192 22,609 22,008
in R&D institutions 14,524 11,909 10,235 9,164 8,343
in R&D units of higher education 8,843 8,458 7,917 7,776 7,611
in R&D units of enterprises 13,017 9,030 6,040 5,669 6,054
Share of enterprise R&D sta#s (%) 35.8 30.7 25.0 25.1 27.5
Total number of R&D units 1,256 1,257 1,287 1,380 1,401
R&D institutions 142 133 118 124 112
R&D units of higher education 940 1,000 1,071 1,078 1,106
R&D units of enterprises 174 124 98 178 183
Share of R&D units of enterprises (%) 13.9 9.9 7.6 12.9 13.1
Total R&D expenditure (HUF/million) 33,725 27,100 31,600 35,300 40,289
From state budget 18,108 9,100 11,000 12,000 14,700
From governmental funds 10,132 
From other domestic sources 538 
By international organizations 346 
By enterprises 13,075 13,085 10,921 9,891 10,096
Share of R&D expenditure by enterprises (%) 38.8 48.3 34.6 28.0 25.1
Total R&D expenditure to GDP (%) 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.0 0.9
Total number of patent applications  12,779 17,039
By Hungarian residents  1,178
By non-Hungarian residents  15,861
Total number of patent registrations  1,409 1,144
By Hungarian residents  536
By non-Hungarian residents  608
Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH, Magyar Statistikai E ≈vko ¨ ny and Kutata ´s e ´ s Fejleszte ´ s (various
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*0was far from e#ective, since it did not strongly motivate researchers to pursue their R&D and
innovation activities.
14 In addition, the size of R&D sectors in CEE countries including
Hungary was too large in relation to their economic scales.
15 Therefore, it is no surprise that
those countries had to reorganize and downsize their R&D units to suit their national wealth
along with changes in their socio-economic systems. Inzelt (1998; 2003), Szalavetz (1999),
and Nikode ´ mis (2003) emphasize the importance of the ‘spontanenous adjustment processs’
relative to ‘external shocks’ in the modanization of the industrial technology, recognizing that
a substantial reduction of R&D expenditure and research sta# at the corporate level had
produced restructuring e#ects necessary for the Hungarian ﬁrms to adapt to a market
economy. As already clariﬁed in the previous section, FDI and foreign-a$liated companies
played a crucial role in the revitalization of the Hungarian economy. Therefore, the preceding
studies paid considerable attention to the relation between ownership forms of enterprises and
14 For more details, see Bala ´ zs (1994, pp. 283-284), Tanaka (1993, pp. 212-215), Matsui (1996, pp. 69-70), and
Inzelt (1998, p. 63). These researchers point out the following as causes of the previous ine#ective R&D sector in
Hungary: (a) Localized division of roles by academic research institutions, high educational insitutions and
industrial research institutions. (b) Domestic enterprises’ low consciousness of the beneﬁts of R&D activities. (c)
Non-availability of economic institutions and agents able to build a bridge between the R&D sector and the
industrial sector.
15 According to Knell (2000, pp. 201-202), as of 1990, scales of R&D activities in CEE countries and in Russia
were comparable to those of Western developed nations, such as Germany and France.
HJC<6GN 6C9 IIH CDGEDG6I: S:8IDG, 1990-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
19,585 19,776 20,758 20,315 21,329 23,534 22,942 23,703
7,739 9,080 8,866 7,815 7,978 8,204 7,766 7,979
6,310 6,558 7,210 7,561 7,452 8,859 8,397 8,528
5,536 4,138 4,682 4,939 5,899 6,471 6,779 7,196
28.3 20.9 22.6 24.3 27.7 27.5 29.5 30.4
1,442 1,461 1,679 1,725 1,887 2,020 2,337 2,426
107 121 131 132 130 121 133 143
1,109 1,120 1,302 1,335 1,363 1,421 1,574 1,613
226 220 246 258 394 478 630 670
15.7 15.1 14.7 15.0 20.9 23.7 27.0 27.6
42,310 46,027 63,591 71,186 78,188 105,388 140,605 171,470
19,975 20,562 31,992 35,305 37,518 48,170 75,386 100,392
3,302 2,996 2,862 3,625 4,106 4,037 4,591 6,455
1,744 3,172 2,929 2,022 2,131 2,189 3,317 2,441
1,997 2,076 2,655 3,375 4,363 11,202 12,918 17,773
11,563 17,221 23,153 26,859 30,070 39,790 48,984 50,864
27.3 37.4 36.4 37.7 38.5 37.8 34.8 29.7
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
20,887 24,979 30,105 38,707 44,974 62,438 83,021 89,327
1,117 832 774 751 787 881 919 842
19,770 24,147 29,331 37,956 44,187 61,557 82,102 88,485
1,910 1,030 1,189 1,257 1,881 1,605 1,306 1,555
534 352 346 263 300 176 
1,376 678 843 994 1,581 1,429 
years), information available at the WIPO website (http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/) and Havas (2002, p. 23).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN +*1their R&D/innovation activities.
According to these studies, foreign-a$liated corporations may have been more engaged in
R&D activities than the wholly domestic enterprises from the early stage of transition. For
instance, Inzelt (1998, p. 68) refers to the strong link between foreign ownership rates and
R&D expenditure based on the enterprise survey conducted by the statistical o$ce in 1996.
Furthermore, she suggests that foreign investors have been constantly utilizing many of R&D
units of Hungarian companies they bought with the aim of introducing new production
licenses and know-how (op. cit., pp. 69-70). Moreover, Nikode ´ mis (2003, 41-42. o.) points out
that multinational corporations in Hungary boosted their R&D spending by ﬁve times in real
F><.2 . R & DEME:C9>IJG: 7N CDJCIGN
Notes: Figure for Hungary is in 2001. Figures for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark
and Spain are in 1999. Figures for the average of 15 EU nations and other countries are in 2000.
Source: Ne ´ pszabadsa ´g . 2003. A ≈prilis 12., 5. o.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*2terms over the six-year period from 1995 to 2000. As a result, the share of multinational
companies in the total R&D spending in the corporate sector increased from 22% to almost
80% during the period. As indicated in Figure 4, the proportion of R&D spending by
multinationals in the Hungarian corporate sector is extremely high by international standards.
Nikode ´ mis states that this is further highlighted by the fact that domestically-owned corpora-
tions, especially small and medium size enterprises, were substantially cutting or restraining
R&D expenditures in that period.
The same trend can be seen for innovation activities. The latest survey by the statistical
o$ce (KSH, 2003b) covering 26,495 manufacturing companies reveals that there is a certain
gap between domestic and foreign companies in terms of achievements in innovation activities.
Table 10 shows that 3,441 or 15.1% of 22,186 wholly domestically-owned corporations
surveyed conducted innovation activities during 1999 to 2001, while 1,055 or 28.7% of 3,679
foreign-a$liated enterprises carried out such activities during the same period, which is about
1.9 times larger than that of the former on a percentage basis. Meanwhile, the statistical o$ce
obtained similar results to the above based on another enterprise survey for 1997 to 1999
(KSH, 2001). Hence foreign-a$liated enterprises may have been continuously more active in
innovation activities than domestic corporations.
Szalavetz (1999, 37.o.), who conducted an in-depth interview survey of ﬁfteen manufac-
turing companies under the control of German capital, advocates that “the technological
beneﬁts of being owned by multinational corporations can be summarized by the fact that
domestic ﬁrms were able to accelerate their technology accumulation process with the help of
foreign direct investment”, adding that the “Hungarian economy has been modernized at a
remarkable scale as a result of technology transfer through foreign investment”.
In addition to this paper, there are many other studies focusing on the achievements of
technology transfer and spillover e#ects stemming from R&D and innovation activities by
F><. 3. R&D A8I>K>I>:H >C HJC<6GN 6C9 >C IIH CDGEDG6I: S:8IDG, 1990-2002
Source: Author’s illustration based on Table 1 and Table 9.
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN +*3foreign corporations. For example, Antalo ´c zy-Sass (2000; 2003b) found the e#ects of technol-
ogy transfer in qualitative changes in Hungary’s export structure from the late 1990s. As
indicated in Table 11, Hungary’s top 10 export goods for 2002, ﬁve of which were high-tech
products, are products of foreign-a$liated enterprises that carried out greenﬁeld investments
within custom-free zones. The total export volume of high-tech products increased by as much
as 5.3 times on a US dollar basis from 1992 to 2002 (Table 12). The total imports of high-tech
products also expanded by 7.6 times during the same period partly due to foreign corporations’
rising demand for plant and equipment investment. Based on statistical data, Hamar (2004)
examined the role of foreign capital from the viewpoint of Hungary’s technological catching-
F><.4 . S =6G: D; FDG:><C CDBE6C>:H >C CDGEDG6I: R&D EME:C9>IJG:
7N CDJCIGN, 1996-1998
Source: Nikode ´ mis (2003, 41. o.).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ++*up and conﬁrmed that industrial sectors requiring higher technologies have larger foreign
participation rates (Table 13). These ﬁndings indicate the beneﬁts of technology transfers
brought about by FDI.
Szanyi (2002) focused on technological spillover e#ects arising from outsourcing con-
tracts and from supplier agreements between multinationals and domestic companies, which
has been rapidly spreading among Hungarian industrial ﬁrms in recent years. He found that
small and medium size ﬁrms are actively involved in businesses outsourced from multinational
enterprises, and aim to adapt to a market economy as well as undergo restructuring. That is,
these domestic enterprises regard outsourcing contracts with multinationals as “the most
































100% domestically-owned enterprise 1,230 669 1,169 3,068 373 3,441 19,375 22,816
Enterprise with foreign participation1 279 122 255 656 56 712 1,368 2,080
100% foreign-owned enterprise 123 40 118 281 62 343 1,256 1,599









100% domestically-owned enterprise 5.4 2.9 5.1 13.4 1.6 15.1 84.9 100.0
Enterprise with foreign participation1 13.4 5.9 12.3 31.5 2.7 34.2 65.8 100.0
100% foreign-owned enterprise 7.7 2.5 7.4 17.6 3.9 21.5 78.5 100.0
Total 6.2 3.1 5.8 15.1 1.9 17.0 83.0 100.0
Notes: 1 Excluding 100% foreign-owned enterprises.
Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH (2003b, 23, 29. o.).



















1 Mobile communication devices 2,691,198 7.84 
2 Piston engine-type manufacturing 2,114,963 6.16 
3 Passenger vehicles 1,481,180 4.31 
4 Input/Output devices 766,262 2.23 
5 Parts for TV sets, radios and communication devices 706,874 2.06 
6 Computer memory devices 550,146 1.60 
7 TV sets 533,894 1.56 
8 Video recorders 529,641 1.54 
9 Automatic data processing equipment/units 508,393 1.48 
10 Conductors 431,424 1.26 
Total for 10 commodities 10,313,975 30.04 8.0 8.5 9.0 5.0
Notes:  indicates ‘applicable’,  indicates ‘not applicable’ and  indicates ‘partially applicable’. For the
numerical estimate of the total for 10 commodities, each  mark is given 1.0 point,  mark 0.5 point
and  mark 0.0 point.
Source: Antalo ´ czy-Sass (2003b, 26. o.).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN +++important sources of technologies, competitive products and markets, each of which is
necessary for their modernization” (p. 20). Meanwhile, multinationals are also actively
promoting their subcontractors to introduce new management techniques and carry out other
organizational innovations (Havas, 2002, p. 28). In addition, these domestic corporations are
devoting themselves to renewing their production facilities, developing new products, prepar-
ing to meet domestic needs, streamlining production systems, and improving designs on the
basis of outsourcing contracts.
There have also been several empirical works on spillover e#ects brought about by foreign
capital. For example, Nova ´ k (2003) conﬁrms the existence of FDI spillover e#ects by
detecting a signiﬁcant positive correlation between TFP and the share of multinational
corporations in the total sales in each industrial sector.
16 Sgard (2002) shows the high
signiﬁcance of these spillover e#ects by introducing into production functions the share of
foreign capital in the total equity capital by sector.
17
The above two studies highlight the major role played by foreign capital and multinational
corporations in the restructuring process of industrial technologies in the corporate sector. As
mentioned in the previous section, drastic structural changes in the Hungarian manufacturing
sector as well as the signiﬁcant improvement of its export competitiveness were leveraged by
the introduction of foreign capital. In addition, it is clear that foreign-a$liated corporations
supported the overall industrial sector in terms of R&D and innovation activities. It is also a
noticeable trend that in recent years, foreign companies in Hungary have been actively hiring
Hungarian researchers and strengthening ties with domestic universities and research insti-
tutes, as pointed out by Havas (2002, p. 29)
However, the above series of positive moves does not imply that an internationally
competitive R&D sector is now emerging in Hungary. Firstly, the quantitative analyses
performed by To ¨r o ¨ k and Petz (1999) and Knell (2000) show that R&D activities are not a
strong explanatory factor for Hungary’s enhanced export competitiveness and its improved
16 The coe$cients of spillover e#ects had a positive sign with statistical signiﬁcance regarding enterprises with
100 or more employees throughout the analytical period, while with enterprises with fewer than 100 employees, it
had a negative sige with statistical signiﬁcance for the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and had no signiﬁcance for the second
half of 1990s.
17 Sgard (2002, pp. 9-11) also reports that the northwest region between the border of the EU and Budapest is
enjoying more positive spillover e#ects than southern and eastern regions, which might have widened the regional
gap in the productivity of local enterprises.
T67A: 12. TG69: A8I>K>I>:H D;
1992 1993 1994 1995
Total exports (million USD) 286.9 321.5 351.7 593.2
Year-on-year change (%) - 12.06 9.37 68.68
Shares in total exports (%) 2.68 3.61 3.26 4.60
Total imports (million USD) 1,001.3 1,145.6 1,416.7 1,394.0
Year-on-year change (%) - 14.41 23.67 1.60
Share in total exports (%) 9.04 9.17 9.54 9.01
Trade balance (million USD) 714.4 824.1 1,065.1 800.8
Source: Compiled by the Author based on Antalo ´ czy-Sass (2003b, 27, 30. o.).
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18 Secondly, the number of patent applications per 100 corporate
researchers, a common indicator of productivity of R&D and innovation activities, dropped by
40% from 19.5% in 1994 to 11.7% in 2002.
19 Thirdly, the already mentioned enterprise
survey (KSH, 2003) indicates that 83% of manufacturing companies polled did not carry out
any innovation activities from 1999 to 2001, almost the same percentages as that recorded in
the previous investigations by the statistical o$ce.
20 These ﬁndings strongly suggest that
18 To ¨r o ¨ k and Petz (1999, 225-227. o.) regressed the export-orientation ratio (ratio of exports to imports) to the
R&D input ratio (ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP), skilled-labor ratio and foreign capital investment ratio,
while Knell (2000, pp. 208-209) conducted regression analysis using the labor productivity improvement rate as a
dependent variable and the R&D imput ratio and the manufacturing productivity growth rate as regressors. As a
result, the former research conﬁrmed that the coe$cient of the R&D input ratio does not have economically-
signiﬁcant explanatory power, and the latter led to the conclusion that the R&D input ratio has no statistical
signiﬁcance.
19 Calculated based on Table 9.
20 For more details, see Inzelt (1994, pp. 149-150), KSH (2001, 7. o.), and Nagaoka and Iwasaki (2003, pp. 12-
14).
H><=-I:8= PGD9J8IH, 1992-2002
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
523.9 2,663.3 3,890.5 4,857.2 6,429.1 6,186.6 7,256.2
11.67 408.32 46.08 24.85 32.36 3.77 17.29
3.98 13.91 16.88 19.39 22.85 20.29 21.13
1,607.2 2,745.7 3,419.8 4,368.5 6,283.7 6,850.3 7,593.0
15.29 70.84 24.55 27.74 43.84 9.02 10.84
9.92 12.93 13.32 15.60 19.59 20.34 20.19
1,083.2 82.4 470.7 488.6 145.4 663.6 336.7
T67A: 13. S=6G:H D; FDG:><C CDBE6C>:H >C M6CJ;68IJG>C< S:8IDG
7N T:8=CDAD<>86A L:K:A, 2001
Number of
enterprises
Fixed assets Sales Exports
Number of
employees
High-tech industries 10.4 80.5 91.5 97.5 66.5
Upper medium-tech industries 11.7 86.0 84.9 93.9 58.4
Lower medium-tech industries 10.7 74.6 71.6 73.7 42.5
Low-tech industries 8.2 58.3 57.0 71.8 36.3
Total 9.5 74.5 75.1 89.2 46.1
Notes: The following industries are included in each sector. (The numbers in parentheses are OECD industrial
classiﬁcation codes.) High-tech industries: aircraft and spacecraft (35.3), pharmaceuticals (24.4), o$ce
and computing machinery (30), communications equipment (32), and medical, precision and optical
instruments (33.1). Upper medium-tech industries: electric machinery and apparatus (31), motor
vehicles (34), chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) (24 excl. 24.4), railway locomotives and other
transport equipment (35.2  35.4), general machinery and devices (29), Lower medium-tech industries:
manufactured fuels (coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel) (23), rubber and plastic
products (25), non-metallic mineral products (26), basic metals (27), fabricated metal products (28)
and ships and boats (35.1). Low-tech industries: Food, beverages and tobacco (15  16), textiles,
apparel and leather products (17  18  19), wood products, paper products and printing (20  21
 22), other manufacturing (36  37).
Source: Selected by the author from Hamar (2004, 48-49. o.).
2004] ;DG:><C 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI 6C9 8DGEDG6I: G:HIGJ8IJG>C< >C =JC<6GN ++-Hungary still has a long way to go before achieving rationalization and revitalization of R&D
and innovation activities. FDI and multinational corporations are expected to make a further
contribution to this ﬁeld.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper presents analysis of the roles of FDI in the corporate restructuring in Hungary
from a multilateral standpoint during the process of the EU accession of Hungary after the
abolition of the socialist planned economy. Foreign capital and multinational enterprises made
a signiﬁcant contribution to this development. However, there are several problems in relying
on FDI to carry out economic transformation and to promote corporate restructuring. Firstly,
there has been an increasing amount of proﬁt repatriation by multinationals in recent years,
which might further increase the current account deﬁcit. For example, the direct investment
income balance recorded a deﬁcit of 3.34 billion Euro in 2003, which is almost the same
amount as the total FDI gross inﬂow in that year (Table 1 (b)). Secondly, ﬁnancial strains on
domestic corporations and on the public arising from the preferential measures for foreign-
owned enterprises have been distorting resource allocations and generating economic inequity
between those who can enjoy the beneﬁts of FDI and those who cannot. Thirdly, regional
disparity in income and unemployment has been widening due to the concentration of FDI in
particular regions. Fourthly, behind the rapid growth of the foreign corporate sector, technol-
ogy networks and inter-industrial relations forged during the socialist era have been com-
pletely abandoned, leading to the emergence of ‘technological economic dualism’ (Farkas,
2000, p. 19). Resolving this problem remains a di$cult policy challenge for the Hungarian
government. And ﬁfthly, the national economies dependence on foreign capital has been
creating anxiety among Hungarian citizens about the future of the country, putting them in
fear of losing their national identity as well as of a massive withdrawal of multinational
corporations from Hungary, which may lead to the hollowing out of domestic industries.
21
However, it is apparent that active investment activities by foreign corporations lowered
hurdles for Hungary to transform its economic system to a market economy by overcoming
capital shortage, boosted the domestic corporate sector, and greatly improved the position of
Hungary in the world economy through the substantial expansion of exports (Szekeres, 2001,
p. 380). Such a tremendous contribution by FDI and multinational enterprises to the
Hungarian economy and industries more than o#sets the problematic side e#ects listed above.
Nevertheless, large-scale foreign capital inﬂow cannot corporate restructuring related prob-
lems in the country, as suggested by the analyses in the previous section referring to R&D and
innovation activities. The remaining problems that have not been examined in this paper
include the underdevelopment of small and medium size enterprises, the unbalanced corporate
ﬁnancial structure heavily dependent on retained earnings, and the insu$ciency of supervision
activities over managers by shareholders and by ﬁnancial institutions. The following remarks
were made by Szalavets (2002) regarding policies to be taken up by CEE countries after EU
accession:
“The transforming countries, in the ‘long transition decade’, have remarkable had success
21 For details on points raised here, see Farkas (2000), Nishimura (2001), and Nagaoka and Iwasaki (2003).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ++.with minimal state intervention. By adapting a passive policy approach, they have allowed
themselves to be driven forward by the modernizing e#ects of foreign direct investment.
However, the challenges that follow EU accession will compel them to adopt an approach of
more active state involvement. Local economic policy decision-makers will need to work out
how to redeﬁne the position of their countries in the world economy.”(p. 5)
Inspired by recommendations such as the above, there is a growing opinion in Hungary
calling for the modiﬁcation of the current policies focusing on attracting foreign capital, in
order to achieve sustainable economic growth over the medium and long term. The passive
strategy for transition to a market economy, which has been driven by the Hungarian
government and the business sector, is standing at a crucial turning point.
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